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I. INTRODUCTION
Picture Raymond Burr in the role of Perry Mason con-
ducting a dramatic cross-examination, O.J. Simpson's Dream
Team challenging Mark Fuhrman's racial biases, or a local de-
fense attorney asking subtle questions that destroy the credibil-
ity of a co-conspirator: a criminal defendant's constitutional
right to challenge her accusers remains an irrefutable hallmark
of American jurisprudence. Yet the actual legal force of the
Confrontation Clause continues to provoke constant judicial dis-
agreement. Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided
Lilly v. Virginia in yet another attempt to refine modern inter-
pretations of exactly what is meant by confronting one's ac-
cuser.2 The Court, as it has with increasing frequency, issued a
divided opinion, 3 though achieved unanimous support of its ver-
dict.4 Justice Scalia's opinion did more than offer an argument
about confrontation, however. His succinct concurrence with
the Lilly plurality decision identified, perhaps unwittingly, the
problems of interpreting the Confrontation Clause in current
American jurisprudence. Scalia held that the fact pattern in
2. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (plurality opinion).
3. Of course, more of the decisions have been close (such as 5-4) decisions
rather than plurality decisions.
4. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 119.
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Lilly represented "a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause viola-
tion."5 But what paradigm?
Over the last two centuries, and particularly since the in-
ception of the Warren Court, Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence has become less coherent, more fractured, and less
predictable.6 As evidenced by the Court's opinions in Lilly, even
when the Justices agree that a governmental action violated a
defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses, they fail to
agree on the basis for their holdings. Although the Lilly Court
agreed to reverse a capital conviction, and remand the case for
reconsideration, the Justices delivered five distinct opinions in
support of that "unanimous" judgment. In fact, the Court was
not able to garner the support of more than four Justices for any
single expression of the rationale behind the ultimate verdict.
The Court, again, failed to offer American jurisprudence a para-
digm for interpreting the Confrontation Clause. While Justice
Scalia may have been certain that the Lilly matter was a viola-
tion on its face, 7 the twists and turns in interpreting the Con-
frontation Clause have failed to offer a reliable platform from
which to make this or any future determinations.
The Court's struggle to decide Lilly exemplifies problems
that are inevitable when a field or sub-discipline is unable to
organize its knowledge according to a dominant paradigm. The
Lilly decision and its lower court progeny suffer from the vastly
divergent views of the Justices as to the proper interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause. As an original provision of the Bill of
Rights, the clause as written was intended to be a clear state-
ment of individual rights and government's responsibilities; it
was drafted as solace to anti-Federalists fearing the return of
5. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. This trend is clearly apparent in the Court's jurisprudential trend in the
last decade. However, this article argues that the trend has been especially perva-
sive in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
7. Such a declaration by Justice Scalia would not be out of character. In a
discussion of Scalia's use of tools such as Webster's Dictionary to arrive at his judi-
cial pronouncements, David M. Zlotnick has noted that "in a few cases, the plain
meaning has been so clear to Scalia that he has simply declared the definition he
finds obvious without citation." David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics:
An Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY
L.J. 1377, 1391 (1999).
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centralized government8 under the new Federal Constitution,
as well as to protect the 1776's guarantee of "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness."9 However, interpreting these rights has
become a staple of modern federal court litigation as jurists
seek to understand what the founders intended, and how their
intent can be applied in today's world.
Part I of this essay defines "paradigms" and their applica-
tion to the emergence of disputes over Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence. It further identifies the connection between the
lack of a unifying paradigm and the prevalence of non-binding
plurality opinions in our constitutional jurisprudence. When
the nation's highest court is unable to agree on an interpreta-
tion of a particular rule of law or constitutional clause, jurispru-
dential disorder may ensue. Part II considers the historical
background of confrontation. Since its inception, a fundamental
conflict has existed between the several purposes of the right to
confront as it posits a categorical right of protection against ar-
bitrary government action but also is intended to guarantee de-
fendants an effective truth-seeking process. This dichotomy
has prevented the formation of a unified paradigm on which to
base current policies and procedures. Part III examines the
maturation of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence since 1960,
arguing that conflicting public policy goals of protecting individ-
ual rights on the one hand and promoting efficient justice on the
other have allowed for an increased identification of confronta-
tion issues with hearsay concerns. In this era, two competing
paradigm alternatives emerged to replace the traditional un-
derstanding of the Confrontation Clause, though neither has
proved forceful enough to exist as the dominant paradigm. Part
IV examines the Court's decision in Lilly v. Virginia, demon-
strating the degree to which conflicting paradigms hinder
rather than enable a clear understanding of constitutional
agendas and frameworks. Part V contains a review and analy-
sis of the most significant opinions issued by circuit courts on
issues reached by Lilly since that decision. It offers clear evi-
dence of the confusion left by the Supreme Court's inability to
arrive at a clear paradigm for interpreting the Confrontation
8. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787 536-37 (1972).
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Clause. Finally, Part VI concludes by offering a final look at the
difficulty of protecting rights equally and effectively when fun-
damental structures of evaluation are lacking in judicial
doctrine.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: A THEORY OF
PARADIGMS AND THE POWER
OF PRECEDENTS
The Sixth Amendment is clearly distinguishable from its
fellow amendments. Directed at one body of litigation, criminal
prosecutions, it remains the most procedurally oriented of the
amendments. 10 The Sixth Amendment details the structure of
the guaranteed speedy and public trial: to be judged by an im-
partial jury, in the jurisdiction "wherein the crime shall have
been committed,"" after the accused has been "informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation."12 The criminally accused is
guaranteed three rights designed to aid his efforts to present a
defense: a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,"13 and "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."' 4 The Sixth
Amendment is the most precisely detailed of the first ten
amendments to the Constitution, providing a clear expression of
its drafters' vision and intent, or so it would seem.
Of all the phrases in the Sixth Amendment, the premise
behind the Confrontation Clause appears obvious: every defen-
dant in a criminal matter brought to trial in the United States
is guaranteed the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."' 5 However, the clause has been dramatically re-
interpreted over time. One scholar recently claimed that the
clause has simply become "another rule of evidence;" 16 another
questioned whether the recent judicial renditions of confronta-
tion have transformed the Bill of Rights into a "Bill of Prefer-
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual
Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
191, 197 (1999).
2002] 459
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ences."17 This construction hardly represents the goal of James
Madison, chief architect of the Bill of Rights, who sought to pro-
tect the right of fair proceedings that first the colonists, and
then the Anti-Federalists, believed had been denied to them. 8
The shift, resulting in the Confrontation Clause being consid-
ered a rule of evidence, has been notable in constitutional juris-
prudence. It represents a fundamental transformation in how a
constitutional clause is perceived, enforced, and eventually di-
minished in power and prestige.
Scholars and jurists have found themselves pondering an
increasing number of critical Confrontation Clause related
cases over the last fifteen years. These cases have fallen into
two categories. First, disputes related to interpretations of vari-
ous rules of evidence having to do with hearsay exceptions. Sec-
ond, disputes considering the direct issue of a defendant's right
to confront witnesses against them at trial. The introduction of
any out-of-court statements, affidavits, or other forms of un-
available declarant-based testimony is precisely what the Con-
frontation Clause originally sought to prevent. 19 Yet the
judicial system regularly deals with ambiguities inherent in in-
terpreting this policy. For an issue that seemed clear-cut to the
founders, the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has be-
come an endeavor fraught with uncertainty and vagueness. 20
A. Defining "Paradigm"
The lack of a clear paradigm for understanding the Con-
frontation Clause is likely a central cause of this jurisprudential
uncertainty. The term "paradigm" became part of American
popular and scholarly culture after the publication of Thomas
17. Robert H. King, Jr., The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution:
Should the Bill of Rights be Transformed into the Bill of Preferences?, 53 OHIO ST.
L.J. 49, 50 (1992).
18. See WOOD, supra note 8.
19. See infra Part IlI.
20. An indication of this confusion may be found in some of the scholarly es-
says written on this topic. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1013 (1998) (noting the instability of the
Court's current Confrontation Clause doctrine); James B. Haddad, The Future of
Confrontation Clause Developments: What Will Emerge When the Supreme Court
Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of Confrontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 77 (1990) (arguing that the future of the Court lies in finding a synthesis
among the different lines of its Confrontation Clause decisions).
[Vol. 22:455
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Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962.21 To
Kuhn, a paradigm, defined as the overarching theories and as-
sumptions that shape a field or discipline of study,22 represents
the acquisition of a body of facts and interpretations sufficiently
advanced as to indicate maturity in a given intellectual en-
deavor.23 A paradigm gains its status when it is "more success-
ful than [its] competitors in solving a few problems that the
group of practitioners [have] come to recognize as acute."24
Once a paradigm is established, it offers a series of principles to
aid in the comprehension of problems as well as the assimila-
tion of new facts and concepts into the prevailing theories used
by scholars in the discipline. 25 The paradigm, therefore, offers a
map for understanding the world of a particular discipline as
well as an approach for solving those difficulties that arise in its
development and growth.
In explaining how scientists come to grasp new ideas, Kuhn
explained that the shifts between paradigms are not linear, but
rather are sudden "revolutions" that occur when a body of facts
emerge that so challenge the past formulation as to render it
virtually useless.26 This process is not cumulative; it can only
be achieved through the rejection and replacement of the previ-
ous paradigm. 27 Only then will a new paradigm or template for
the understanding of a particular event or process emerge
through a process that discards "previously standard beliefs or
procedures and, simultaneously ... [places] those components
of the previous paradigm with others."28 Kuhn argues that all
paradigms are "socially constructed through a process of discus-
sion and consensus-building about theories, experimental meth-
ods, instrumentation, and validation."29 Most significantly, a
paradigm offers criteria for formulating and testing an idea or
21. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
22. See Jeffrey D. Kovac, Science, Law, and the Ethics of Expertise, 67 TENN.
L. REV. 397, 399 (2000).
23. See KUHN, supra note 21, at 11.
24. See id. at 23.
25. See id. at 37, 56.
26. See id. at 65.
27. See id. at 84-85.
28. KUHN, supra note 21, at 66.
29. Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer
for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1576-77 (2000).
2002] 461
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principle. 30 Ideally, an emphasis on the principles behind a par-
adigm may bring some sense and predictability to the law. 31
Without a dominant paradigm, a discipline may be left devoid of
any unifying principles upon which to rest its analyses.
B. Shifting Paradigms in Confrontation Clause
Jurisprudence
The current state of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
most recently expressed in Lilly v. Virginia,32 is the clear result
of conflicting paradigmatic models for the clause's interpreta-
tion. The traditional Confrontation Clause paradigm embraced
the essential goals of the founders by providing for in-person
testimony by adverse witnesses to limit the overarching power
of prosecuting officials to enter into evidence testimony that
was coerced and then not openly tested for accuracy. 33 That
paradigm remained intact despite a variety of limited excep-
tions to the rule throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 34
However, in the last forty years, that paradigm has been
challenged by facts and practices not easily assimilated into the
traditional norms.35 In particular, recent courts have revised
and reiterated their understanding of the clause in the follow-
ing categories of cases: those depending on the co-conspirator
hearsay exception pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801
(d)(2)(E);36 those having to do with the admissibility of custodial
confessions and whether they qualify under the "against penal
interest" exception as embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence
803(b)(4);37 those relating to the admission of hearsay testimony
pertaining to child abuse victims, whether videotaped or from
30. See id. at 1577.
31. See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Par-
ties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 796 (2000).
Persily and Cain apply this logic to an understanding of paradigms of American
parties. However, I believe this sort of formulation helps both explain the
problems in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence today as well as offers a solution
to the conflicts for the future.
32. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
33. See infra Part II & III.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See id.
36. See infra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
37. See id. and accompanying text.
462 [Vol. 22:455
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other sources; 38 and those involving testimony of minors and
the elderly who are fearful of the consequences of testifying in
court against those who might retaliate.39 In deciding these
cases, the Court generally relies on the amorphous term "public
policy" whenever it holds that criminal defendants may be de-
prived of their constitutional rights to confront witnesses
against them. Still, federal courts have not been able to develop
a consistent and coherent paradigm of what that Confrontation
Clause "public policy" actually is, or how it shapes the applica-
tion of the right to confront in various judicial proceedings. In-
stead, two paradigm alternatives have emerged: on one hand,
since the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,40 follow-
ing the lead of California v. Green,41 the Court has generally
treated the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules of evi-
dence as almost synonymous, interpreting their background
and objectives as one. 42 This "confrontation/hearsay" paradigm
tests violations of the Confrontation Clause according to the re-
liability/trustworthiness standards established in Roberts.43
However, this proposed paradigm has never satisfied the de-
mands of public policy and jurisprudence to present a clear
model for Confrontation Clause decision making. In particular,
issues such as the testimony of child sex abuse victims, distin-
guishing truly self-inculpatory statements against penal inter-
est from those that are not, and co-conspirator's confessions
continue to challenge just how far the Confrontation Clause is
implicated in the reliability/trustworthiness test.44
38. See id. and accompanying text.
39. Though not yet the issue in federal cases, two proposed extensions of the
Confrontation Clause exceptions have appeared in the literature and in some state
cases: protection for elder witnesses and for those testifying about gang violence.
For discussions of these matters, see J. Steven Beckett & Steven D. Stennett, The
Elder Witness-The Admissibility of Closed Circuit Television Testimony After Ma-
ryland v. Craig, 7 ELDER L.J. 313 (1999); Lisa M. Rogan, The Price of Protecting
Our Children: The Dilemma of Allowing Children to Testify as Key Witnesses to
Gang Violence, 20 J. Juv. L. 127 (2000); Meredith E. James, Narrowing the Gap
Between Florida's Hearsay Exceptions for Child Declarants and Elderly Declar-
ants: Sections 90.803 (23) and 90.803 (24), Florida Statutes, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV.
309 (2001).
40. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
41. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
42. See generally Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.
43. See infra notes 116-137 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-49 (1990).
2002] 463
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In the last ten years, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas,45 has proposed another Confrontation Clause para-
digm, often referred to as an "originalist view" of the clause.46
This view purports to return Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence to its foundation, arguing that the clause should only be
invoked when a witness is directly testifying against a defen-
dant or when the state is attempting to introduce into evidence
ex parte documents prepared specifically for that purpose.47
However, this paradigm also fails to take into account the many
complexities embodied in modern jurisprudence, as well as the
policy goals implicit in rendering timely and accurate convic-
tions of guilty parties. 48
With the nineteenth century paradigm outdated, and
neither of the current paradigms satisfactory to meet the de-
mands of the issues presented, the Court has generally failed to
treat the whole body of Confrontation Clause cases uniformly. 49
45. That Justice Thomas has joined Justice Scalia in this line of cases is no
surprise since Thomas' rate of concurrence with Scalia (80% between 1991 and
1995, for example) is higher than the rates of concurrence of any two other Justices
on the Court. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 209 (1999).
46. See, e.g., Cornelius M. Murphy, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation
Clause: A Case Study in Originalist Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1997) (stating "Originalism . . . shuns the legal in-
determinancy and result-oriented decisions associated with nonoriginalist
approaches ... ").
47. For further discussion on this issue, see Elkan Abramowitz, Justice
Thomas, Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, N.Y. L.J., March 3, 1992, at 3
(noting that Thomas suggests that the Confrontation Clause applies only to wit-
nesses appearing at trial and is not implicated in hearsay at all).
48. In his concurrence in United States v. Hubbell, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, develops this originalist line of thought in explaining the historical
etymology of the word "witness." "Dictionaries published around the time of the
founding included definitions of the term 'witness' as a person who gives or fur-
nishes evidence. Legal dictionaries of that period defined 'witness' as someone who
'gives evidence in a cause."' 530 U.S. 27, 50 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Thomas and Scalia hold, therefore, that confronting an adverse witness would be
confronting a person who gives or furnishes evidence since, unlike the complexities
of our dictionaries, there seems to have been a uniform definition of the word "wit-
ness" at the time of the drafting of the Confrontation Clause.
49. Legal scholars have echoed this confusion. A few recent articles have at-
tempted to draw lines between several of the major cases that have reflected on the
Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., John Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, Virtual
Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191
(1990); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998); Joshua Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hear-
464 [Vol. 22:455
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Without a clear understanding of the clause, the Court contin-
ues to argue over the policies implicated in allowing the denial
of confrontation rights to criminal defendants. In fact, even
when the Court does issue a "unanimous" verdict in deciding a
confrontation case, its decision often involves multiple concur-
rences accompanying a plurality opinion as the Justices strug-
gle to derive a clear understanding of the clause's real meaning
and significance. 50 When the Court is unable to arrive at a reli-
able and applicable interpretation of one constitutional clause,
thus muting the power of its arguments, it is likely that the
same confusion will affect the judicial construction of other
clauses of the Constitution.
C. Plurality Opinions and the Problem of Precedents
Supreme Court plurality opinions are an increasingly likely
outcome of a clearly fractionated Court.51 This is especially true
in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, where several of the
most recent Confrontation Clause cases, including the most re-
say Rule: The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33
CREIGHTON L. REV. 763 (2000). However, most recent scholarship on issues raised
in the debate over the Confrontation Clause has focused either on individual cases,
or on cases relating to one of the topics noted above. See, e.g., Cathleen J. Cinella,
Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation - United States v. Gi-
gante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135, 137 (1998) (examining the diminution of the
right to confront by a federal judge's decision to extend the Craig rule for child
witnesses to fearful witnesses in a New York racketeering trial); Leslie Morsek,
Lilly v. Virginia.: Silencing the "Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exception with Regard to
an Accomplice's Testimony and its Rejuvenation of the Confrontation Clause, 33
AKRON L. REV. 523, 547-48 (2000) (briefly describing the Lilly case's impact on
confrontation jurisprudence). Scholars are not often dealing head-on with the
broad question of the viability of the Confrontation Clause as a whole. The argu-
ment here is that an examination of policy issues behind the Court's decisions on
confrontation will help bridge that gap, or at least explain why the inability to
agree on a unifying paradigm allows courts to adopt public policy concerns in lieu
of a predictable jurisprudence based on precedence.
50. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116
(1999), exemplifies this trend with its unanimous decision followed by four sepa-
rate opinions, concurring in part or in whole with Justice Stevens' decision and
with the final reversal of the state's affirmation of the defendant's conviction. The
Court's verdict in Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), a decision that
skirted the confrontation issue though related to the issues within its jurispru-
dence, reflects a similar divide between the Justices. See infra Part IV.
51. See generally, Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsider-
ing the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419
(1992).
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cent, Lilly v. Virginia, have been decided by plurality decisions
rather than by any clear majority focused on rationale or pol-
icy. 52 Both the Court and legal scholars continue to struggle
with the effect, both precedential and intellectual, of Supreme
Court plurality opinions. 53 While legal scholars may ponder the
intellectual impact of adopting tests such as the "narrowest
grounds" 5 4 versus a legitimacy model 55 versus a hybrid version
of traditional and more modern approaches to plurality56 prece-
dents, lower courts are forced to make their own assessments of
the binding nature of plurality decisions.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONFRONTATION
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. Before the Bill of Rights
A criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses
was not the invention of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. In
fact, the historical antecedents to this right may date back to
the ancient Hebrews, who reputedly required accusing wit-
nesses to testify in front of the accused.57
52. Several Supreme Court decisions have shaped this approach. See Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738
(1994); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) and supra notes 49-51 and ac-
companying text.
53. For examples of recent legal scholarship on plurality opinions, see
Thurmon, supra note 51; Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme
Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 261 (2000); Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plu-
rality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593 (1992). The key Supreme Court case
discussing the impact of plurality decisions, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977), was decided in 1977. Although the Court seemed to abandon the Marks
"narrowest grounds" test in Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), it re-
turned to that analysis in O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997). In other
words, even the Supreme Court remains unclear as how lower courts should inter-
pret the highest court's inability to reach a majority opinion.
54. Thurmon, supra note 51, at 420.
55. Kimura, supra note 53, at 1604 ("This Note advocates the recognition of
five categories of plurality decisions, each with different precedential
implications.").
56. See Thurmon, supra note 51, at 451-56; see also Hochschild, supra note 53,
at 286-87 (advocating a consideration of the "skeptical attitudes toward the Court
popular during Chief Justice Jay's tenure" as a way of limiting the problems in
interpreting plurality decisions).
57. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and the
ACLU of Virginia for the Petitioner, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/7
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This policy shifted by the Middle Ages when continental ju-
dicial systems began to limit the examination of witnesses to
the exclusive use of written questions.58 However, the English
system of common law evidence clung to the confrontation of
adverse witnesses throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, as evidenced by the writings of Shakespeare as well
as statutes enacted under King Edward VI in 1552 and Queen
Elizabeth I in 1558.59 Still, some English courts chose not to
follow this model. In particular, the equity courts and the court
of the Star Chamber allowed evidence only by affidavit and
through what we would consider hearsay.60 The infamous and
much-cited example of Sir Walter Raleigh's treason conviction
serves as a reminder of the problems inherent in such an ap-
proach.61 However, this evidence alone should not shape one's
understanding of the historic purpose of the Confrontation
Clause.
Historically, confronting adverse witnesses served purposes
beyond banning the admissibility of testimony within ex parte
affidavits.62 In fact, a scholar has argued that the history of the
common law took a fundamental turn in the early eighteenth
century when it became more adversarial. 63 According to Ron-
ald Jonakait, the history of confrontation as a testimonial re-
quirement is far more fluid than other writers have
5881), 1999 WL 901782 at *4 [hereinafter ACLU Lilly brief] (citing Deuteronomy
19:15-18).
58. See id. at *4-5 (citing C. VAN CAENEGEM, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 19 (1972)).
59. Justice Breyer's discussion on this topic clearly shows a careful reading of
the ACLU Lilly Brief. However, Breyer's abbreviated discussion of the history of
confrontation in English law offers some additional source material as well. See
Lilly, 527 U.S. at 140-41 (Breyer, J., concurring).
60. See ACLU Lilly Brief, supra note 57, at *5.
61. See id. at *9; see also Kenneth W. Graham, The Right of Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99,
99-100 (1972) (disputing the factual basis of the Raleigh trial mythology).
62. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992).
63. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alter-
native History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 92-93 (1995). Jonakait argues that the Sixth
Amendment did not simply constitutionalize the common law. He claims that the
goal of the Sixth Amendment in fact was to "protect against federal encroach-
ments," certainly a goal of many American revolutionaries. Id. at 112. See also,
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (concerning control of the gradual concentration of the several powers).
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acknowledged. 64 For example, throughout the first half of the
eighteenth century, New York courts not only admitted testi-
mony through affidavit, they also prohibited defense cross-ex-
amination. 65 However, by the 1770s, New York courts began to
take tentative steps that mandated the "essential components
of an adversarial system," recognizing a fair trial could be more
easily guaranteed by that method.66 The courts of Virginia were
even less circumspect. In the waning years of the colonial gov-
ernments, Virginian lawyers were confronting witnesses not as
a tool to ascertain reliability but rather as a method of advocacy
for their criminal clients. 67
B. Developing a Constitutional Right to Confront
The Constitutional Convention met from May through Sep-
tember 1787.68 All accounts agree that there was little discus-
sion of the need to confront adversarial witnesses during these
extended deliberations. 69 Further, there was no direct mention
of this topic in The Federalist Papers.70 However, even in the
earliest drafts of the Sixth Amendment, the right to confront
witnesses was linked to the other criminal procedure clauses of
this amendment. On June 8, 1789 Madison proposed the
following:
Fourthly. That in article 1", section 9, between clauses 3 and
4 [of the Constitution], be inserted these clauses, to wit: ... In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of
the accusation, to be confronted with his accusers, and the wit-
nesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defence. 71
64. See Jonakait, supra note 63, at 116.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 117.
67. See id. at 118.
68. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 passim (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966).
69. See Jonakait, supra note 63, at 120.
70. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 51 passim (James Madison).
71. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORI-
GINS 385-86 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
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The Confrontation Clause became an essential constituent
of the Bill of Rights. Created to provide the ultimate protection
against the return of uncontrollable and arbitrary power of the
government over the people, the Sixth Amendment affirmed
that protections existed even for a person accused of criminal
activity. At the heart of these shields was the right to address
and question one's accusers personally, putting adverse wit-
nesses to the ultimate test of facing the persons he or she had
accused. A sufficient number of states ratified the Bill of Rights
by 1791, leaving the Sixth Amendment in virtually the same
shape and form as in Madison's original proposal. 72 However,
the Confrontation Clause would not rest long without re-
interpretation.
Initially, the Confrontation Clause appeared to be a key-
stone of criminal procedure law, open to few, if any, exceptions.
Admissions of out-of-court testimony were severely limited. In
Mima Queen v. Hepburn,73 Chief Justice Marshall first ad-
dressed the issue of hearsay evidence, refusing to admit a por-
tion of a deposition discussing a petitioner's ancestor without
proof that the ancestor was indeed deceased.74 No significant
challenges to this near-literalist view of the Confrontation
Clause appeared for the most of the nineteenth century. Then,
in 1895, a landmark case appeared that remains a central focus
of Confrontation Clause litigation today.75 With its decision in
Mattox v. United States, the Court ushered in a new era of Con-
frontation Clause policy, one that began to look beyond the lit-
eral language of the clause and, eventually, to distance it from
the original goals of its designers. 76
C. The Mattox Decision
In 1891, Clyde Mattox was tried and convicted of the mur-
der of John Mullen, a crime that took place "within that part of
the Indian Territory ... under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
73. Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813).
74. See id. at 296.
75. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
76. See id. at 243.
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court."77 After the original conviction was reversed and the case
remanded, the defendant was convicted again in 1893.78 The
defendant again appealed his conviction. The District Court
had, he claimed, refused to "permit the defendant to introduce
the testimony of two witnesses to impeach the testimony of one
of the deceased witnesses, upon the ground that the proper
foundation had not been laid."79 Since the deceased witnesses
met an "unavailability" requirement (later codified as one of the
exceptions to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence),8 0 "a tran-
scribed copy of the reporter's stenographic notes of their testi-
mony ... supported by his testimony that it was correct, was
admitted to be read in evidence, and constituted the strongest
proof against the accused."8 ' Since this testimony could not be
"questioned," petitioner Mattox contended that he was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to be able to confront the witnesses
against him.8 2 The Court affirmed the conviction based on the
challenged evidence, foreshadowing modern treatments of the
Confrontation Clause in two ways: it heralded a policy that
moved away from the original intent of the clause; and it was a
divided decision, with three Justices dissenting from the
majority.8 3
The petitioner argued that "reasons of convenience and ne-
cessity which excuse a departure from the ordinary course of
procedure in civil cases cannot override the constitutional provi-
sion in question."8 4 However, the Court held that the circum-
stances surrounding the original testimony argued in favor of
admissibility.8 5 Citing a series of state and federal cases, the
Court opined that this new precedent would present "no hard-
ship upon the defendant to allow the testimony of the deceased
witness to be read."8 6 Noting that the historical object of the
Confrontation Clause was to prevent "depositions or ex parte af-
77. Id. at 238 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 238-39.
80. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
81. Id. at 240.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 250-51.
84. Id. at 240.
85. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 241.
86. Id. at 242.
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fidavits... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness," the Court
detailed the dual benefits of this approach:
[T]he accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollec-
tion and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the man-
ner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should
never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death
of the witness . . .7
Despite this admonition, the Court held that occasional ex-
ceptions are acceptable in the interest of public policy.88 The
Court articulated a public policy that still weighs heavily: "The
law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not
be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be
preserved to the accused." 9 With one swipe of the pen, the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of confrontation had suddenly
been designated an "incidental benefit."90 Justice Brown noted
that although the Court was
bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it
existed at the time it was adopted ... [a] technical adherence to
the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried
farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and
farther than the safety of the public will warrant.91
As long as the petitioner had once had the opportunity to cross-
examine an adverse witness, his constitutional protections had
been preserved.
The dissenting Justices took issue with this policy. Agree-
ing that this issue had no settled law behind it, Justice Shiras
noted that "it must not be overlooked that the primary object of
the trial is not to vindicate the truth or consistency of witnesses,
but to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."92 The
dissent did not disagree with the admission of the testimony
87. See id. at 242-43.
88. Id. at 243.
89. Id.
90. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 257 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
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from the previous trial. It did, however, dispute the Court's rul-
ing that the petitioner was not allowed to introduce evidence to
impeach that testimony.93 In other words, if the evidence was
admitted, the defendant had the right to treat it as he would all
other adverse evidence and retain the right to rebut it. In es-
sence, Justice Shiras warned that when an exception to the
Confrontation Clause is necessary, it should be limited to only
the narrowest exception required; otherwise, the proceedings
should continue according to all other rights and responsibili-
ties accorded a criminal defendant. 94
D. Post-Mattox Refinements
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court continued to
reinterpret the limits of the Confrontation Clause. In 1899, the
Court held in Kirby v. United States95 that written evidence ad-
verse to the defendant was not admissible unless a witness
presenting the document could be confronted in court.96 The
Court used Motes v. United States97 to remind prosecutors of
their responsibility to make all reasonable efforts in order to
produce adverse witnesses at trial. Otherwise, a defendant's
right of confrontation must trump any public policy goals of se-
curing a conviction.98 Then, in 1926 the Supreme Court an-
nounced its decision in Salinger v. United States.99 In appealing
his mail fraud conviction, the petitioner in Salinger argued that
the admission of hearsay evidence against him (letters, bank
deposit slips and book entries) 100 was "in derogation of his right
under that Amendment to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."101 The Court's holding against the petitioner is
notable for two reasons. First, it announced that "[t]he purpose
of that provision [Confrontation Clause] .. .is to continue and
preserve that right, and not to broaden it or disturb the excep-
93. Id. at 260.
94. Id. at 260-61.
95. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
96. Id. at 55.
97. 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900).
98. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
99. 272 U.S. 542 (1926).
100. Id. at 547.
101. Id. at 545, 547.
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tions."102 Since "[t]he present contention attributes to the right
a much broader scope than it had at common law," the Court
refused to sustain the petitioner's claim.10 3 Second, another
characteristic of Confrontation Clause decisions surfaced. Con-
frontation Clause violations would only be determined after a
painstakingly methodical analysis of the evidence on a case-by-
case basis. Harkening to future opinions that would permit the
admission of evidence deemed collateral to the main issue but
still considered sufficiently necessary and trustworthy so that it
should be admitted despite the Confrontation Clause, the Su-
preme Court carefully detailed its understanding of which bank
deposits and letters were admissible against the plaintiffs pro-
tests and which were not.10 4
By the end of this period of Confrontation Clause interpre-
tation, the paradigm seemed clear. The Court had demon-
strated a strong preference for the apparent intent of the
original clause, with a few exceptions only when absolutely nec-
essary. But no pattern of open exceptions or broad interpreta-
tions of the clause was yet apparent.
IV. A MATURING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
For more than forty years after the Salinger decision, the
Supreme Court heard few significant Confrontation Clause
cases, an unsurprising fact considering this was during an era
when the Court was generally uninterested in the rights of
criminal defendants. In contrast, the Warren Court's increased
focus on individual rights eventually led to decisions such as
Miranda v. Arizona10 5 and Gideon v. Wainwright0 6 in the mid-
1960s. Soon thereafter, defendants began to fight more vigor-
ously for their right to confront. By the end of the Warren
years, the Court began to set the standards for the mandates of
the Confrontation Clause: what it required, what access to evi-
102. Id. at 548.
103. Id.
104. Salinger, 272 U.S. at 547.
105. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (establishing the so-called Miranda rights to
protect the accused from inadvertently incriminating himself in violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights).
106. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (establishing an indigent defendant's right to
counsel).
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dence was required, and when evidence was both necessary and
trustworthy. 10 7 The original intent of the Confrontation Clause
became muddied amid the concerns for the truth-seeking goals
of confrontation. The pursuit of confrontation was seen over-
whelmingly as a truth-seeking venture rather than a defen-
dant's categorical right. Under this paradigm, courts found it
easier to allow exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, as long
as other forms of verification were possible. However, these ef-
forts were still strictly limited. For example, in 1974, the Court
held in Davis v. Alaska 08 that state policy considerations, such
as the confidentiality of the identity of juvenile offenders, was
not enough to abrogate the rights guaranteed by the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 10 9
In 1975, the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
helped refine the Court's application of hearsay exceptions.
Within the next decade, the Confrontation Clause became inter-
twined with considerations over the admissibility of hearsay ev-
idence. Policy in enforcing the rules and protecting the
confrontation rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment has
evolved accordingly. However, this evolution has been accom-
panied by confusion as courts appear unable to distinguish be-
tween the constitutional requirements of confrontation and the
admissibility standards for hearsay evidence. Although the
traditional confrontation paradigm no longer sufficed, no new
paradigm was able to unilaterally fill that void.
A. Modern Mandates of the Confrontation Clause
The first major focus of the more modern confrontation liti-
gation was a renewed consideration of the clause's mandate.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant
will "be confronted with the witnesses against him." 10 In the
late 1960s, the Court held that this was a right of opportunity,
not a guarantee of action, affording the courts below an oppor-
tunity to admit evidence without necessarily guaranteeing a de-
107. Among the few cases of significance to this consideration in the 1960s
was Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965), which incorporated the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the States.
108. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
109. Id. at 320.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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fendant's right to confront adverse witnesses in some
situations. In both Barber v. Page"' and Berger v. California,"2
the Court held that prosecutors must make good-faith efforts to
produce adverse witnesses; however, once those efforts are
deemed good-faith, albeit unsuccessful, the unconfronted ad-
verse testimony could be admitted without violating a constitu-
tional right.
Seventeen months after Berger, the High Court handed
down a decision in California v. Green"13 that announced a fun-
damental shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Reflect-
ing upon Mattox v. United States," 4 Justice White noted that
the history of the Confrontation Clause permits the admission
of a declarant's out-of-court statements when the declarant is a
testifying witness subject to cross-examination, "the greatest le-
gal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."115 In hold-
ing that an out-of-court statement, even if given under
circumstances that would not assure accuracy, is admissible
when a witness was testifying in court, 16 Justice White erased
a critical line between hearsay evidence and the Confrontation
Clause. Accuracy and reliability were now deemed the critical
reasons for confrontation. Although White noted that the Court
did not find the Confrontation Clause to be identical to hearsay
and its exceptions, 17 his opinion opened the door for precisely
this interpretation of the constitutional right to confront.
California v. Green"8 led inexorably to the pivotal decision
in Ohio v. Roberts" 9 a decade later. Roberts remains the
landmark rule on the opportunity to cross-examine required by
111. 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). In Barber, no such good faith efforts were
made to obtain the witness' presence at trial other than to ascertain that the wit-
ness was in federal prison.
112. 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (retroactively applying holding in Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 799 (1968)).
113. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
114. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
115. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 159.
117. Id. at 155. However, Justice Harlan's concurrence did strike a warning
note as to the danger of any implication that hearsay and confrontation were
merged. "If 'confrontation' is to be equated with the right to cross-examine, it
would transplant the ganglia of hearsay rules and their exceptions into the body of
constitutional protections." Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
119. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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the Constitution. Roberts presents the oft-cited and applied
two-prong test for the admissibility of testimony when a court
deems that evidence reliable although the declarant is unavail-
able.120 Since Roberts, the Court has embellished and developed
this test, but has not strayed from the fundamental beliefs be-
hind it: public policy mandates that apparently trustworthy evi-
dence be introduced at trial, even if the defendant is not able to
examine the witness presenting the testimony. 121
In Ohio v. Roberts,122 the Court decided whether a defen-
dant's right to confront witnesses against him was violated by
the admission of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness
who did not appear at trial. 123 A witness who had provided crit-
ical testimony at the defendant's preliminary hearing on
charges of using stolen credit cards did not appear at the defen-
dant's trial, which resulted in his conviction. 124 The defendant
claimed the witness' testimony did not have sufficient indicia of
reliability to be admitted without cross-examination. 25 The
prosecution argued that its issuance of five separate subpoenas
for four different trial dates, all of which remained unanswered,
satisfied the "unavailability" requirement necessary to allow for
the introduction of preliminary examination testimony pursu-
ant Ohio Revised Code Annotated section 2945.49.126 The pros-
ecution's burden was to make a showing that it made a good
faith effort to secure the absent witness' presence in order to
secure the testimony's admission as necessary. 27
In its decision, the Court chose to link the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rules of evidence, tightening the analyt-
ical relationship between the two separate bodies of law. 28 Ac-
knowledging that the Confrontation Clause reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, the Court nev-
ertheless held that "competing interests, if closely examined
120. Id. at 65.
121. See supra Part IIA.
122. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
123. Id. at 58.
124. Id. at 58-59.
125. Id. at 61.
126. See id. at 59; see also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (1975).
127. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25
(1968)).
128. See id. at 62.
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may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial."129 The
Court clearly articulated the policy driving this balancing test:
"every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforce-
ment, and in the development and precise formulation of the
rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." 130 The
Confrontation Clause was now treated as if it were a rule of
evidence with its ultimate objective to further effective prosecu-
tions and convictions. 131
Roberts provided a two-prong test for the admissibility of
non-confrontable testimony into evidence. 32 According to Rob-
erts, the Sixth Amendment mandates a "rule of necessity."' 33
Only if a witness is truly unavailable may the evidence be con-
sidered despite its hearsay quality. 34 The second prong seeks
to protect the "trustworthiness" of that evidence, even if the de-
clarant is unavailable for cross-examination, a process designed
to protect the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process."135
In its search for "indicia of reliability," the Court noted that the
trier of fact must be afforded "a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement". . ." [r] eliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness." 136 In this way, the Sixth Amendment's
imperative that evidence be in "substantial compliance with the
purposes behind the confrontation requirement" could be
met. 37
The Roberts test became the standard for Confrontation
Clause analysis as well as for hearsay reliability tests, offering
a dramatic challenge to the traditional confrontation paradigm.
129. Id. at 63, 64 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 64.
131. The Roberts court acknowledged that there had been "an outpouring of
scholarly commentary" over the court's attempt to reconcile the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rules. However, the Court asserted that no "commentator
[has] demonstrated that prevailing analysis is out of line with the intentions of the
Framers of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 66 n.9.
132. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
136. Id. at 65-66.
137. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970).
20021 477
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
Even Justice Brennan's dissent 138 in Roberts differed with the
majority only on the application of the new test, not on its mer-
its. 139 While reaffirming the standards set by Mattox, Barber,
and other critical cases on the Confrontation Clause, the Rob-
erts Court accepted that the admissibility of evidence under the
Confrontation Clause should be tested in much the same man-
ner established for the hearsay rules of evidence. 140 Still, the
dissent did not ignore this aberration from the demands of the
Confrontation Clause, cautioning that "good-faith efforts" to
make witnesses available must be seriously made and evalu-
ated.141 Otherwise, the dissent warned, courts would challenge
the invocation of the Barber court that "[t] he right of confronta-
tion may not be dispensed with so lightly."142
Eight years later, Coy v. Iowa 143 further refined the right of
confrontation. In many respects, Coy represents a return to the
traditional paradigm of the Confrontation Clause. Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia held that the defendant's right to
confront adverse witnesses was denied when a screen was
placed between the defendant and the child sexual assault vic-
tims who were testifying. 44 Constitutional confrontation "guar-
antees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact."145 Scalia held that the right
to confront adverse witnesses was essential in perpetuating a
system of justice "in which the perception as well as the reality
of fairness prevails."146 Therefore, despite the potential trauma
that might affect the complaining witnesses, two thirteen-year
old girls who had allegedly been sexually assaulted by the de-
fendant, the Court held that placing a screen between the wit-
138. Brennan was joined in his dissent by Marshall and Stevens. Roberts, 448
U.S. at 77.
139. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 77 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
140. See id. at 65-66.
141. Id. at 80.
142. Id. at 82 (quoting Barber, 390 U.S. at 725).
143. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
144. Id. at 1021.
145. Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 1018-19 (citations omitted).
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nesses and the defendant violated the Confrontation Clause's
guarantee. 147
However, Scalia's very literal approach to the Confronta-
tion Clause 148 was qualified both by Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion (in which she was joined by Justice White) and by
Justice Blackmun's dissent (in which he was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist).149 Justice O'Connor sought to open the con-
frontation door with respect to child abuse victims.15° In fact,
Justice O'Connor states that "nothing in today's decision neces-
sarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child
witnesses."115 Paving the way for the Court's subsequent deci-
sion in Maryland v. Craig,52 O'Connor indicated a willingness
to dispense with face-to-face confrontation when policy man-
dates the protection of child witnesses, often the only witnesses
to their own abuse. 153 Justice Blackmun's dissent indicated a
willingness to take this one step further, asserting that the con-
viction should have been upheld. 54 Reaffirming the Court's
holding in Kentucky v. Stincer, 55 Justice Blackmun wrote that
"the essence of the right protected is the right to be shown that
the accuser is real and the right to probe accuser and accusation
in front of the trier of fact." 56 Blackmun advocated a further
expansion of exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 57 essen-
tially endorsing the reliability/trustworthiness paradigm
opened by California v. Green. 158
In deciding Coy, a divided Court indicated the extent to
which the old paradigm of confrontation had failed to encom-
pass the facts of this case, and also that no new unifying para-
digm had appeared to establish a revision of Confrontation
147. The Court noted that the screen would have allowed the defendant to
dimly perceive the witnesses but prevent the witnesses from seeing the defendant
at all. Id. at 1015.
148. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1013.
149. Id. at 1022-35.
150. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1023.
152. See infra notes 219-231 and accompanying text.
153. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022.
154. Id. at 1025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987).
156. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1026 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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Clause jurisprudence. By the time of the Coy decision, it was
clear that the traditional paradigm was in jeopardy, not able to
account for the challenges raised by contemporary criminal ac-
tivity and prosecutorial desires for conviction. Scalia's empha-
sis on an "originalist" or "plain meaning" interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause left no room for consideration of the
rights of individual witnesses. Nor does Scalia's interpretive
philosophy accommodate the desire of law enforcement and
prosecutors to bring defendants to justice whose actions may al-
ready have so traumatized a victim as to make it virtually im-
possible for that person to participate in face-to-face
confrontation. On the other hand, Scalia's opinion protects, in
an absolutist manner, the right of a defendant to confront his
accuser.159 Scalia, therefore, stands for the categorical right of
confrontation rather than the reliability/trustworthiness model
that had been emerging since the Roberts decision just eight
years hence. The O'Connor concurrence and the Blackmun dis-
sent, however, foreshadowed the next series of confrontation
cases the Court would consider.
B. A Paradigm of Allegorical Confrontation
By the late 1980s, the Court seemed increasingly willing to
find a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses as a right
that could be satisfied by allegory as well as by actual face-to-
face confrontation. This trend, evincing a clear preference for
criminal convictions over an individual's right to confront, ap-
pears in several lines of cases. Two lines predominate: cases
deriving from Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the co-con-
spirator hearsay exemption;160 and cases deriving from child
abuse prosecutions. 161 In both categories, the demands of "pub-
lic policy," defined differently, and sometimes amorphously,
have regularly outweighed the absolute right of confrontation in
criminal trials.
In 1970, the Court opened the door to the acceptance of co-
conspirator out-of-court statements with its verdict in Dutton v.
Evans.162 Five years later, the Federal Rule of Evidence codi-
159. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017.
160. See infra notes 162-198 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 199-239 and accompanying text.
162. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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fled this verdict in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (E).163
However, it was not until the Court's decision in United States
v. Inadi,164 that it became clear that even the unavailability
showing required in Roberts would not be required as a condi-
tion to the admission of out-of-court statements of nontestifying
co-conspirators whose statements otherwise satisfy Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). 16 5
Perhaps the most significant component of the Inadi deci-
sion is its assertion that the unavailability test actually de-
tracts from the Confrontation Clause's supposed mission "of
[advancing] the truth-determining process. '166 In Inadi, the pe-
titioner had been convicted of conspiring to manufacture and
distribute methamphetamine. 167 As part of their case, the pros-
ecution successfully introduced into evidence five recorded tele-
phone conversations made between various participants in the
drug conspiracy. 168 On appeal, the petitioner challenged the ad-
mission of the statements of a co-conspirator that had impli-
cated him, arguing that the prosecution had failed to
demonstrate the unavailability required as a precondition to be-
ing excepted from the Confrontation Clause. 69 The Supreme
Court held that this unavailability requirement was not man-
dated by the Sixth Amendment in the case of a co-conspirator's
testimony, largely because this evidence dealt with issues dif-
ferent than those found in Ohio v. Roberts, from which the un-
availability standard is derived. 170 The Inadi Court therefore
dramatically limited the Roberts rule to an analysis of unavaila-
bility with regard to the presentation of prior testimony at a
new trial. 171
In Inadi, Justice Powell opines that in the case of co-con-
spirator's evidence, the statements made in the course of and in
163. An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceed-
ings, Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1938 (1975).
164. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
165. Id. at 400.
166. Id. at 396.
167. Id. at 388-89.
168. Id. at 390.
169. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 390-91.
170. Id. at 392-94 (stating "The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts fo-
cuses on those factors that come into play when the prosecution seeks to admit
testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of live testimony at trial.").
171. See id. at 393.
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furtherance of the conspiracy are actually more reliable than
those made as a witness at trial.172 "Even when the declarant
takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a
significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements
during the course of the conspiracy."1 73 Therefore, according to
Justice Powell, "[tihere appears to be little, if any, benefit to be
accomplished by the . . .unavailability rule" in this case. 174
Drawing upon the "better evidence" rule as found both in com-
mon law and the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court therefore
refused to defend the "unavailability rule because it does not
actually serve to exclude anything, unless the prosecution
makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available wit-
ness."1 75 Powell's decision therefore betrayed a new twist in the
policy objectives elucidated in Confrontation Clause disputes.
Requiring a rule of unavailability for the admission of co-con-
spirator statements would, in Powell's opinion, put an unwar-
ranted, and unncessary burden on the prosecution. 76 To meet
the unavailability standard, a prosecutor would be forced to
specifically identify and locate each declarant and attempt to
procure him for trial, "even if neither the prosecution nor the
defense wished to examine the declarant at trial." 77 Powell
found that the protection this system would offer was "margi-
nal" and that "the Confrontation Clause does not embody such a
rule."178 Therefore, confrontation was not mandated in this
type of situation.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall 179 saw the issue differently:
[T]he Court today holds that the Clause is not offended when the
prosecution fails to make even the slightest effort to produce for
cross-examination the authors of the out-of-court statements with
which it hopes to convict a defendant. Because I cannot share the
majority's implicit faith that the camaraderie of a criminal con-
spiracy can substitute for in-court cross-examination to guarantee
172. See id. at 395.
173. Id.
174. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 399.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Justice Brennan joined in this dissent. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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the reliability of conspiratorial statements, I can neither accept
the majority's analysis nor stand silent while the values embodied
in the Sixth Amendment are so cavalierly subordinated to
prosecutorial efficiency.' 80
Marshall passionately argued that the statements made in the
process of a conspiracy should be considered unreliable, not in-
herently reliable: "[tihat a statement was truly made 'in fur-
therance' of a conspiracy cannot possibly be a guarantee, or
even an indicium, of its reliability."18 ' The root of the co-con-
spirator exemption is presumably not because of a belief in their
special reliability but rather because of their supposed position
as substantive law since "every statement of co-conspirators...
is thus a verbal act admissible against each conspirator as if it
had been his own."1 8 2 Marshall found that this agency theory,
labeled by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee as "at best a
fiction,"1 3 "[speaks] not at all to the Confrontation Clause's con-
cern for reliable fact-finding."18 4 Marshall reaffirms "the critical
importance of cross-examination in the truth-seeking pro-
cess."18 5 Hence, the dissent here displays a very different un-
derstanding of the Confrontation Clause and its purposes:
[T]he Framers, had they the prescience, would surely have been
as apprehensive of the spectacle of a defendant's conviction upon
the testimony of a handful of surveillance technicians and a very
large box of tapes recording the boasts, faulty recollections, and
coded or ambiguous utterances of outlaws. The Court's decision
helps clear the way for this spectacle to become a common occur-
rence. I dissent.'8 6
A year later, the Court's decision in Bourjaily v. United
States8 7 enhanced a prosecutor's freedom to introduce out-of-
court statements when made by co-conspirators. In Bourjaily,
the Court made three important decisions: one, it lowered the
standard of proof required to demonstrate an out-of-court de-
clarant's participation in the conspiracy to the preponderance of
180. Id. at 401.
181. Id. at 404.
182. Id. at 405-6.
183. Id. at 406.
184. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 406.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 411.
187. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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the evidence standard; l8 two, it allowed bootstrapping, or the
consideration of proffered hearsay statements in determining
the declarant's membership in the conspiracy; 8 9 and three, it
did not mandate any inquiry into the independent indicia of re-
liability of a statement required by the Confrontation Clause. 190
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that the
admissibility of co-conspirators' statements was established
over a century and a half ago. 191 Furthermore, he found that
"[t]o the extent that these cases have not been superseded by
the Federal Rules of Evidence, they demonstrate that the co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is steeped in our juris-
prudence. '192 This "firmly ... rooted" exception therefore puts
statements such as these "outside the compass of the general
hearsay exclusion."19 3
The dissent disagreed vociferously with the majority in
ways that reflect upon contemporary interpretations of the Con-
frontation Clause. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, decried the majority's willingness to allow
the "abandonment of the independent-evidence requirement,"
fearing it would "eliminate one of the few safeguards of reliabil-
ity that this exemption from the hearsay definition pos-
sesses." 194 Furthermore, Blackmun admonished the Court for
avoiding "a determination whether any 'indicia of reliability'
support the co-conspirator's statement, as the Confrontation
Clause surely demands." 95 The Bourjaily dissenters noted with
astonishment the move by the majority to "simultaneously re-
move[ ] from the exemption one of the few safeguards against
unreliability that it possesses." 96 To avoid the Confrontation
Clause by "conjuring up the 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' as
some benign genie" could not "extricate the Court from its in-
consistent analysis."' 97 The dissent was not alone in finding the
188. Id. at 175.
189. Id. at 181.
190. Id. at 183.
191. Id.
192. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 186.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority's willingness to accept co-conspirator-declarant's testi-
mony virtually unheeded. Since Bourjaily, every circuit has
held that there must be some showing of independent cor-
roborating evidence in support of the reliability of the out-of-
court statements proffered by the prosecution in these cases. 198
In the same year that the Court handed down Bourjaily, it
had the opportunity to revisit the child sex abuse witness ques-
tion left open by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Coy.199 In
1987 the Court decided Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,200 in which it
decided whether a child's confidential Children and Youth Ser-
vices file should remain confidential or if the state's failure to
disclose it would violate the confrontation rights of an accused
sex offender. In other words, "to what extent [does] a State's
interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concern-
ing child abuse ... yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to discover favorable evidence"
and the right to confront adverse witnesses? 20 1 The petitioner
had been charged with various sexual offenses against his mi-
nor daughter.20 2 During pretrial discovery, he had served Chil-
dren and Youth Services ("CYS"), a protective service agency,
with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning his
daughter. 20 3 CYS failed to honor the subpoena. 20 4 Appealing his
criminal conviction, the petitioner claimed that in "denying him
access to the information necessary to prepare his defense, the
trial court interfered with his right of cross-examination "by un-
dermin[ing] the Confrontation Clause's purpose of increasing
the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial."20 5
Justice Powell responded, holding that the Court had no de-
sire to "transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitution-
198. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1181-82 (1st Cir.
1993); United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Garbett, 867 F.2d 1132,
1134 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 577-78 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 998-99 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
199. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
200. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
201. Id. at 42-43.
202. Id. at 43.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
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ally compelled rule of pretrial discovery."20 6 The Confrontation
Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; "it
only would have been impermissible for the judge to have pre-
vented Ritchie's lawyer from cross-examining the daughter."
20 7
The right to confront was reserved for witnesses, not for acquir-
ing information in discovery, a procedural matter.
The Court heard Kentucky v. Stincer208 in 1987 and again
moved to protect child witnesses, holding that preventing the
defendant from attending a competency hearing of the two
young victims in this case had not violated his right to con-
front.20 9 Since the defendant was fully availed of his right to
cross-examine witnesses adverse to him in the trial, his exclu-
sion from a pre-trial procedure was deemed not in violation of
the Sixth Amendment. 210 In making this decision, the Court
displayed a willingness to consider abridging an individual's
constitutional right for the assumed broader "good" of a crimi-
nal conviction.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens,
dissented, marveling at the Court's apparent ignorance of the
significance of the Confrontation Clause.211 Without explana-
tion, Justice Marshall noted the majority Court had limited the
interest of the Confrontation Clause to simply that of cross-ex-
amination, not the other purposes it served.212 Marshall as-
sailed the Court's willingness to consider a defendant's right to
confront satisfied with "nothing more than an opportunity to
cross-examine these witnesses at some point during his trial"
claiming that this was an "analytical blinder[ ]" that prevented
a defendant from exercising his or her constitutional right of
confrontation appropriately. 213 Quoting from the Court's deci-
sion in Lee v. Illinois,214 Marshall reminded the Court that "the
constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation serves cer-
tain 'symbolic goals' as well. . . '[t]he Confrontation Clause ad-
206. Id. at 52.
207. Id. at 54.
208. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
209. Id. at 740.
210. Id. at 745.
211. Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. See id.
213. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 748-49 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
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vances these goals by ensuring that convictions will not be
based on the charges of unseen and unknown-and hence un-
challengeable-individuals.'"215 Here, Marshall appeared to re-
affirm other significant ideals embodied within the right to
confront, particularly its role in quieting the overarching power
of government to act in arbitrary ways in order to achieve
convictions.
However, despite warnings such as Marshall's, the Court
with Maryland v. Craig,21 6 firmly reduced the power of the Con-
frontation Clause to a guarantee that its central concern was
simply "to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a crimi-
nal defendant."21 7 The Court announced that "though we reaf-
firm the importance of face-to-face confrontation with witnesses
appearing at trial, we cannot say that such confrontation is an
indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
the right to confront one's accusers." 218 The facts of Maryland v.
Craig provided the Court with the opportunity some of the Jus-
tices had sought to open the bounds of the Confrontation
Clause.21 9 A six-year old girl had allegedly been sexually
abused repeatedly while attending a pre-kindergarten and kin-
dergarten center owned by the defendant.220 The State of Mary-
land claimed that there was convincing evidence that the child
would be traumatized further by having to face her attacker,
215. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee, 476 U.S.
at 540).
216. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
217. Id. at 845. The Court made particular note that the respondent Mary-
land was supported by numerous amicus curiae briefs in support of its statute
protecting the child abuse victims. Id. at 839.
218. Id. at 849-50.
219. This action provoked a rush of scholarly outpouring. Whereas many arti-
cles were supportive of the Court's move toward apparent protection of minors who
were sex abuse victims, some argued that the Court's actions may have hurt those
it intended to protect. See Briana L. Schwalb, Child Abuse Trials and Confronta-
tion of Traumatized Witnesses, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185, 194-98 (1991); Jac-
queline Beckett, True Value of the Confrontation Clause: Study of Sex Abuse
Trials, 82 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1636-37 (1994). Legal scholars also have been concerned
with the reliability of children as witnesses, especially when traumatized either by
abuse or even the allegations of abuse. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D.
Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implica-
tions, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 103-06 (2000) (recommending videotaping of all in-
terviews with children who may be called as witnesses to verify their credibility or
suggestibility).
220. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
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and that the trauma would likely hinder her ability to testify in
front of him.221 Since a Maryland statute allowed child victims
of alleged sex abuse to testify against their accusers through
one-way close-circuit television without having to see the ac-
cused, the defendant was denied an opportunity to confront his
accusers, although he remained in electronic communication
with his counsel throughout the proceedings. 222 The Court
found the Maryland statute constitutional. 223 Though face-to-
face confrontation reflects values at the core of the Confronta-
tion Clause, "it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation
right."224 The public policy was clear: in cases where a child
would be traumatized by seeing her alleged attacker, especially
to the extent that the trauma might impair the child's testi-
mony, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit alternative
procedures of the rigorous adversarial testing designed to pre-
serve "the essence of effective confrontation. '225
Joining in dissent was an unlikely quartet: Justices Scalia,
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. 226 Strange bedfellows, per-
haps, but together these Justices sought to return the Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence to a more traditional paradigm in
order to satisfy the perceived intent of the founders "that none
of the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statu-
tory law could overcome a defendant's right to face his or her
accusers in court."227 Criticizing the majority for "recharacteriz-
ing" the right to confront as only one of many elements embed-
ded within the Confrontation Clause, Scalia again emphasized
his belief that the Sixth Amendment explicitly protects the
right to a face-to-face confrontation of one's accusers. 228 Strik-
ingly, however, Scalia moved slightly away from his categorical
view of confrontation to take into account some of the Court's
past decisions on confrontation. He appeared to endorse the
Roberts unavailability and reliability tests, indicating that his
221. Brief for Petitioner, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478),
1990 WL 505648, at *5-6 (March 2, 1990).
222. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840-842.
223. Id. at 860.
224. Id. at 847.
225. Id. at 857.
226. Id. at 860.
227. Craig, 497 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 862.
488 [Vol. 22:455
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/7
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
quarrel with the majority in part rests on their failure to impose
this standard upon the Maryland statute.229 Although Scalia
was not on the Court for the Roberts decision, Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan and Stevens had all dissented in that opinion. 230
In the Craig dissent, Scalia and his fellow dissenters seemed
willing to endorse this analysis, at least tangentially, for the
purpose of demonstrating just how far from the intent of the
founders the Court had strayed. The Court, Scalia noted, had
"no authority to question" the value of confrontation, yet had
done so in its opinion. 231 Scalia was willing to concede that al-
though the Maryland statute was "virtually constitutional" for
the sake of argument, it was not actually so, and therefore
should not have been upheld as such.232
By 1991, federal prosecutors eagerly embraced a very nar-
row construction of the Confrontation Clause in an amicus brief
in support of the state of Illinois in White v. Illinois.233 In White,
even the most traditionalist members of the Court, Scalia and
Thomas, held back from a decision that would have "virtually
eliminate[d] its [Confrontation Clause's] role in restricting the
admission of hearsay testimony."23 4 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist returned the Court to "steer a middle
course" recognizing once again that hearsay rules and the Con-
frontation Clause were designed to protect similar values and
stem from the same roots.235 However, Rehnquist's opinion con-
tinued to challenge the hearsay/confrontation paradigm in that
it, in the words of Justice Thomas, "unnecessarily ... compli-
cated and confused the relationship between the constitutional
right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of evidence." 236 The
Court decided this case, which determined whether evidence
admissible under the spontaneous declaration and medical ex-
amination exceptions require unavailability, without a lengthy
discussion of the relationship between hearsay and confronta-
229. See id. at 865-66.
230. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 77 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231. Craig, 497 U.S. at 869-70.
232. Id. at 870.
233. 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992).
234. White, 502 U.S. at 352.
235. Id. at 352-53 (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tion. Thomas 237 emphasized, however, that the Confrontation
Clause applied only to those witnesses testifying in court or
through affidavits, depositions or confessions, "made in contem-
plation of legal proceedings." 238 Admitting that "[t]here is virtu-
ally no evidence of what the drafters of the Confrontation
Clause intended it to mean," Thomas argued for the narrowest
possible interpretation of a categorical right to confront.239
By the early 1990s, therefore, Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence was a muddied waters. The traditional paradigm of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was long past.
Justices Scalia and Thomas had proposed a new paradigm
based on one appraisal of the intent of the founders, even while
they admitted that there was little evidence evincing that in-
tent. Justice O'Connor, supported at times by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, had refined the Roberts standard for opening the
bonds of confrontation. Justice O'Connor's paradigm was fo-
cused more on protecting vulnerable witnesses (as in Craig)
whereas Rehnquist's concern revolved around convictions based
on other methods of ensuring reliability (as in Bourjaily). Fi-
nally, the remaining guarantors of individual liberties, for ex-
ample Brennan and Stevens, straddled the paradigms,
concurring with Scalia on the categorical requirements of con-
frontation but leaning towards a trustworthiness paradigm
such as the Roberts standard. These divergent paradigms of-
fered little guidance for future decisions, either in lower courts
or for the Supreme Court itself. By the end of the 1990s, the
Court's confrontation with the Sixth Amendment could only
continue to offer confusion in lieu of a paradigm.
V. LILLY V. VIRGINIA: WHEN A UNANIMOUS
JUDGMENT MEANS ANYTHING
BUT UNANIMITY
On December 4, 1995, when three Virginia men embarked
upon a drunken escapade that resulted in the abduction and
murder of a bystander, they could hardly have imagined that
their names would end up known for the reopening of a consti-
237. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in his concurrence. Id. at 358.
238. Id. at 364.
239. White, 502 U.S. at 359.
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tutional debate.240 When Virginia officials took and then en-
tered into evidence an in-custody statement of defendant
Benjamin Lilly's brother Mark, considered by the government
to be a statement against penal interest and by the defendant
as an intrusion upon his constitutional rights of confrontation,
the Court again had an opportunity to resolve disputes over the
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.241 However, despite
a unanimous decision of the nine Justices, the Lilly opinion was
hardly a unified opinion.
A plurality of Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer agreed
on six parts of the opinion, joined by Justice Scalia in three sec-
tions and by Justice Thomas only in two. 242 Justice Breyer filed
an independent concurring opinion, while Justices Scalia and
Thomas each filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment. 24 3 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, filed an opinion that concurred
with the Court's judgment but strongly differed with Stevens'
reasoning behind the decision.244 At the heart of the differences
were the Justices' different interpretations of the Confrontation
Clause as well as the policies that underlay its application to
the present circumstances. These differences continue to reflect
the consequences of the lack of a consistent paradigm for con-
frontation cases. 245
240. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999).
241. See Brief for Petitioner, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-
5881), 1998 WL 928305, at *23 (Dec. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Lilly Petitioner Briefl;
Brief for Respondent, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881), 1999 WL
47109, at *17 (February 1, 1999) [hereinafter Lilly Respondent Briefl.
242. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 119.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 144.
245. The Lilly decision has already been followed by scholarly commentary.
Some have argued that Lilly may have settled the "against penal interest" ques-
tion. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Future of Codefendant Confessions, 30 SE-
TON L. REV. 516, 540 (2000). Others see the plurality's division of "against penal
interest" statements into three classes instructive in deciding whether or not a
statement is firmly rooted and therefore beyond Confrontation Clause analysis.
See Kim Mark Minix, Lilly v. Virginia. Answering the Williamson Question - Is the
Statement Against Penal Interest Exception "Firmly Rooted" Under Confrontation
Clause Analysis?, 51 MERCER L. REV. 1343, 1355-56 (2000).
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A. The Facts in Lilly v. Virginia
On their face, the facts of Lilly present the prototype of why
the right to confront is the preferred form of truth-seeking. All
parties to the case agree that on the evening of December 4,
1995, petitioner Benjamin Lilly, along with his brother Mark
and Gary Wayne Barker, embarked upon a twenty-four-hour
binge which included heavy drinking and marijuana use by
both Mark and Barker.246 The three men broke into one home
and stole three weapons, a safe, and a quantity of liquor.247
They then visited a friend, drank the stolen liquor and two of
men, Mark and Barker, smoked marijuana. 248 After being
asked to leave, the three drove to a trailer park, rented a room,
and continued to imbibe throughout the night.249 The following
day, December 5, the drinking and wandering continued.250
Later, the men stopped to fire the stolen firearms at some geese,
then returned to the trailer park where they unsuccessfully at-
tempted to trade the pistol for more marijuana. 251 Thereafter,
they drove to a bar, where Mark and Barker unsuccessfully at-
tempted to sell a pistol and a rifle.252 In the early evening, the
trio's car broke down in front of a convenience store. 253 An inno-
cent man, DeFilippis, happened to be standing by his car
outside the convenience store when the drunken trio arrived.254
After robbing the convenience store the men kidnapped him,
drove to a secluded area, and required him to strip.25 5 DeFilip-
pis was then shot to death with the pistol.256 Shortly thereafter,
the trio robbed another store and approximately forty-five min-
utes later attempted to rob one more convenience store.257 On
their escape from that store, the trio's car again broke down.258
When police arrived on the scene, petitioner Benjamin Lilly re-
246. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120.
247. Id.
248. Petitioner Brief at *4, Lilly, supra note 241.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. *5.
253. Petitioner Brief at *5, Lilly, supra note 241.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120.
257. See Petitioner Brief at *5, Lilly, supra note 241.
258. See id.
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mained in the car and was taken into custody (the police held
him in the car for two more hours), but Mark and Barker fled.259
The police apprehended them soon after their escape. 260
After taking all three men into custody, police questioned
each of them separately. 261 Benjamin Lilly did not mention the
murder to the police. 262 He did claim, however, that Mark and
Barker forced him to participate in the robberies. 263 Mark and
Barker provided investigators with somewhat different ac-
counts of the crime spree but each maintained that Benjamin
had both masterminded the robberies and killed DeFilippis.26 4
Throughout his interrogation, which took place over two pe-
riods between 1:30 a.m. and 2:53 a.m. on December 6, Mark
continually emphasized how drunk he had been during the en-
tire crime spree. 265 He also admitted that he stole liquor twice
during that period, that he had handled a gun earlier in the
day, and that he had been present during the more serious
thefts and the homicide.2 66 The police informed Mark that he
would be charged with armed robbery and threatened that if he
failed to break "family ties," he might be "dragged" into a life
sentence by his brother.267 Mark then insisted that Benjamin
had instigated the carjacking and that he (Mark) "didn't have
nothing to do with the shooting."268
Mark refused to testify as a witness at Benjamin's trial, in-
voking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.269 The government then sought to introduce into evidence
Mark's in-custody statements that implicated Benjamin as the
instigator of the crime, and, most importantly, the triggerman
in the homicide. 270 Mark's identification of Benjamin as the
killer was critical to the Commonwealth's capital case against
Benjamin. Under Virginia's capital murder statute, the trigger-
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 120-21.
265. Id. at 121.
266. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Petitioner Brief at *7, Lilly, supra note 241.
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man is deemed so culpable as to merit the death penalty.271
Benjamin was eventually convicted of robbery, abduction,
carjacking, possession of a firearm by a felon, and four charges
of illegal use of a firearm, as well as capital murder, for which
he received a death sentence.272 Without Mark's statement, pe-
titioner claimed, Benjamin might not have been sentenced to
death.
The convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Vir-
ginia's Supreme Court on the grounds that Mark's statements
were against penal interest and were reliably established by
other evidence and therefore fell within an exception to the Vir-
ginia hearsay rule.273 The Virginia high court also held that
Mark's statements had "sufficient guarantees of reliability to
come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule" and
therefore satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause.27 4 Believing that the Virginia decision might represent
a significant departure from "our Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence," the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.27 5
B. The Lilly Court's Attempt at a Rule
The United States Supreme Court considered four issues
raised in the Virginia court's verdict: (1) the admissibility of
Mark's statement as a statement against penal interest; (2)
whether the statement fell within a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay rule; (3) whether the statement met the Roberts
trustworthiness standard; and (4) whether the imposition of
special conditions upon an in-custody statement against penal
interest could ever make it admissible within the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause.276 These considerations revolved
around the issues central to the last quarter-century's debate
over the Confrontation Clause: should the right of confrontation
be considered either categorical or simply to assure truth-find-
ing and therefore expendable when other "truth" guarantees
271. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (1995).
272. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 122.
273. See id.
274. Id. (citations omitted).
275. Id. at 123.
276. See id. at 116, 122, 125, 130, 135.
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suffice, or has the right to confrontation essentially become no
more than another rule of evidence and therefore subject to
amendment whenever "justice" allows?
Just five years after the Court's decision in Williamson v.
United States,277 the Lilly facts returned the Justices to a con-
sideration of whether the reliability of a statement against pe-
nal interest was "so firmly rooted" in the common law that it did
not violate the Confrontation Clause. 278 The Williamson Court
had held the alleged statement against penal interest was not
"truly self-inculpatory" to the extent that it would provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability because the declarant's confession, es-
pecially the parts that implicated the defendant, did little to
subject the declarant to criminal liability. 279 Hence, although
the Williamson Court did warn against accepting confessions
unless they were "truly self-inculpatory," it did not rule on the
Confrontation Clause claim raised by the defendant, finding
such a ruling unnecessary given the Court's holding on the un-
reliability of the evidence. 28 0
Conversely, the government argued in Lilly that Mark's in-
custody statement need not be subjected to a reliability test
since the statement met the standards of admissibility as a
"firmly rooted exception" to hearsay rules.281 The Common-
wealth asserted that "[t]here can be no question today but that
the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest
qualifies for firmly rooted status."28 2 A plurality of the Lilly
Court disagreed, holding that "accomplices' confessions that in-
culpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted ex-
ception to the hearsay rule."28 3 The Court reasoned that the
277. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
278. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
279. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604.
280. See id. at 605 (stating "In light of this disposition, we need not address
Williamson's claim that the statements were also made inadmissible by the Con-
frontation Clause ... in particular we need not decide whether the hearsay excep-
tion for declarations against interest is 'firmly rooted' for Confrontation Clause
purposes.").
281. Respondent Brief, Lilly, supra note 241, at 24, 27.
282. Id. at 27. Respondent cited the statutes of twenty-nine states codifying
rules of evidence admitting statements against penal interest in the manner of
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) as well as abundant case law supporting those statutes. Id.
at 27 n.5, 28.
283. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134.
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"against penal interest" exception was clearly distinguishable
from previously recognized "firmly rooted exceptions." 284 Gen-
erally, the other exceptions rely on an assumption that accuracy
may be deemed to accompany statements made "without a mo-
tive to reflect on the legal consequences of one's statement, and
in situations that are exceptionally conducive to veracity."285
Although a plurality of four Justices, Stevens, Souter, Gins-
berg, and Breyer, held that the statement against penal interest
generally should not be considered "firmly rooted," three Jus-
tices, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Kennedy, disagreed with the fi-
nality of this proclamation. 28 6 Though the Chief Justice agreed
with the plurality's judgment reversing the Virginia Supreme
Court, he did so on the grounds that Mark Lilly's in-custody
statement was the type of assertion that must be "viewed with
'special suspicion' given a codefendant's 'strong motivation to
implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself."287 However,
the Chief Justice firmly refused to foreclose the possibility that
statements against penal interest, including even those incul-
pating codefendants, may fall within a firmly rooted exception
to the hearsay rule.288 Fearing that such a blanket ban might
preclude critical reliance on in-custody confessions and there-
fore hinder many possibly successful prosecutions, Rehnquist
asserted that a consideration of whether or not truly self-incul-
patory statements against penal interest might indeed fall
within a "firmly rooted exception" definition is necessary. 289 In
effect, his opinion appears to support a broadening exception
that would admit into evidence a declarant's genuinely self-in-
culpatory custodial statements that also inculpate a
codefendant.
Moreover, Rehnquist advocated a paradigm that favors
prosecutorial goals over the rights of individual defendants.
Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Dutton v. Evans,290
which recognized that a declarant's statements to a fellow pris-
oner, obviously custodial in nature, bear sufficient indicia of re-
284. Id. at 126.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 144 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 144, 146.
288. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 146.
290. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
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liability such that it could be placed before a jury without
confrontation of the declarant. 291 However, Rehnquist's use of
Dutton fails to take into account the specific circumstances that
made that particular statement admissible under the Confron-
tation Clause. The statement admitted in Dutton was one of
identification by a declarant of a defendant of whom the declar-
ant already had personal knowledge. 292 Moreover, there was
clear evidence in Dutton that the declarant's personal knowl-
edge had already been established by another witness' testi-
mony and by the declarant's prior conviction. 293 Further, the
Dutton Court had held that the possibility that the declarant's
statement was based on faulty recollection "is remote in the ex-
treme."294 Finally, the declarant's statement was spontaneously
made and clearly against his penal interest.2 95 Therefore, Rehn-
quist's use of the Dutton analogy here must be treated as sus-
pect and was likely shaped by his clear intent to promote a
policy favoring a broader line of exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause than the Lilly plurality would allow.296
Both the plurality opinion and the Rehnquist-O'Connor-
Kennedy concurrence delved into the applicability of a Roberts-
type test in circumstances like the Lilly case.297 In other words,
seven of nine Justices continued to merge the Confrontation
Clause issue with a consideration akin to hearsay exceptions.
This assumption was questioned by Justice Breyer, although he
accepted that such a deliberation should probably be left "open
for another day."298 Breyer's concurrence did, however, outline
the parameters of the debate. 299 Relying heavily on the ACLU's
amicus brief, Breyer argued that the current hearsay-based
Confrontation Clause test was too narrow because it might au-
thorize admission of out-of-court statements that were prepared
as trial testimony as long as such statements fell into any one of
291. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
292. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88.
293. See id.
294. Id. at 89.
295. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 148 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 140, 142-43 (Breyer, J., concurring).
299. See id. at 141.
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a number of "well-recognized hearsay rule" exceptions. 30 0 How-
ever, he also noted that the current test was "arguably too
broad" in subjecting the admission of any relevant hearsay
statement to rigorous constitutional analysis even if that state-
ment was "only tangentially related to the elements in dispute,
or was made long before the crime occurred and without rela-
tion to the prospect of future trial."301 Breyer remained troub-
led by the lack of a coherent and reliable paradigm under
which to evaluate whether evidence violates a defendant's con-
frontation right but was unable to outline a solution to the
dilemma.
Both the plurality opinion and the Rehnquist concurrence
eventually shifted the terms of their discussions to a considera-
tion of a Roberts analysis. 30 2 However, the opinions differed
sharply in their adoption of portions of the Roberts two-pronged
test. The plurality focused on the Virginia Supreme Court's as-
sessment of the reliability of Mark Lilly's statements within the
"context of the facts and circumstances under which [they were]
given."30 3 Stevens rejected such a determination, however. Ste-
vens found it "highly unlikely" that the presumptive unreliabil-
ity of accomplices' confessions that inculpate one another could
ever be effectively rebutted when such statements are given
under conditions that replicate the traditional confrontation
concerns of ex parte affidavit practice. 304 Hence, the plurality
found Mark's confession not to be sufficiently reliable as to
make it appropriate to waive Benjamin's right to confronta-
tion.305 "[Nleither the words that Mark spoke nor the setting in
which he was questioned provides any basis for concluding that
his comments regarding petitioner's guilt were so reliable that
there was no need to subject them to adversarial testing in a
trial setting."30 6 The plurality therefore implicitly endorsed the
Roberts test for reliability, but found that Mark's testimony did
not meet the standards enunciated previously by the Court.
300. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141 (Breyer, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 142.
302. See id. at 135 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 148 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
303. Id. at 135.
304. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 139.
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Hence, the paradigm of the Confrontation Clause as a rule of
evidence remained intact.
The Rehnquist concurrence also pointed towards a Roberts
analysis, but with different intent. Rehnquist noted that
neither of the lower courts had analyzed Mark's confession
under the second prong of the Roberts test; moreover, the state
court's Roberts analysis met the demands of the state's hearsay
rules, not the Confrontation Clause.30 7 Hence, Rehnquist too
endorsed a merged view of Confrontation Clause and hearsay
exception jurisprudence. The Chief Justice clearly believed the
plurality had overstepped its bounds, reaching an issue that
had not been considered by the lower courts.308 Asserting that
the trial judge was in a better position to evaluate "whether a
particular statement given in a particular setting" was suffi-
ciently reliable such "that cross-examination would add little to
its trustworthiness," Rehnquist held that broad exceptions to
the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rule should be accepted if
so determined by a lower court judge.309
Justices Thomas and Scalia presented an additional para-
digm for Confrontation Clause analysis. Along with offering his
own concurrence, Justice Thomas supported the Chief Justice's
argument that using in-custody accomplice statements that in-
criminate a defendant does not by definition violate the Con-
frontation Clause.310 Referring to his view of the Court's
"original understanding of the Confrontation Clause," Thomas
warned against "freez[ing] our jurisprudence by making trial
court decisions excluding such statements virtually
unreviewable."31'
The Thomas and Scalia concurrences in Lilly reflect their
mutual attempts to return Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
to their particular concepts of the "original" intent of the Con-
frontation Clause. Scalia's characterization of the admission of
Mark Lilly's statement as "a paradigmatic Confrontation
Clause violation"312 reflected his agreement with Justice
307. See id. at 148 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
308. See id.
309. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
310. See id. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring).
311. Id. at 144.
312. Id. at 143 (Scalia , J., concurring).
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Thomas' judicial philosophy that the Confrontation Clause "ex-
tends to any witness who actually testifies at trial and is impli-
cated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial material, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."313 These state-
ments represent Scalia and Thomas' attempts to return the
Confrontation Clause to one of its original purposes: to prevent
the use of testimony by affidavit, as was accepted in English
equity courts.314 By reaffirming Thomas' position in White,
Scalia's and Thomas' concurrences in Lilly continue in a vein of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that one scholar has
deemed "intellectually consistent, historically accurate, and
constitutionally sound."315 But consistent, accurate, and sound
with regard to what? Scalia remains unrelenting in his quest to
return the Confrontation Clause to what he believes to be its
"original intent." Five months after the Lilly decision was
handed down, he authored a scathing dissent to the Court's de-
nial of certiorari in a Confrontation Clause case that originated
in Texas. Joined by Justice Thomas, Scalia reminded the Court
that "I dissented in Craig, because I thought it subordinated the
plain language of the Bill of Rights to the 'tide of prevailing cur-
rent opinion."' 316 He reaffirmed his faith in the plain meaning
of the Bill of Rights, noting that when the Court "does take... a
step into the dark it has an obligation ... to clarify as soon as
possible the extent of its permitted departure."31 7 Preventing a
child victim of sex abuse from testifying even though the wit-
ness wanted to do so (as the petitioner had alleged), did more
than water down the right of confrontation; it instead very well
may have "washed [it] away."318
The history of the intent behind the Confrontation Clause
is far from precise. Despite the number of times the clause has
undergone reinterpretation and refocus in the more than two
313. Id. at 143 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting from his own concurrence in
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
314. See supra note 63.
315. See Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay
Rule: The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33
CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 802 (2000).
316. Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034, 1035 (1999).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1038.
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centuries since the Constitution's ratification, justices and
scholars continue to ponder the true place and role of confronta-
tion in the American judicial process. The Lilly Court's plural-
ity plus four concurring opinions precisely marks the various
lines of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as it now stands. It
also has left lower courts without any clear benchmark to
follow.
VI. CIRCUITS IN SEARCH OF A RULE
As is often the case when lower courts are left to rely on a
plurality decision of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals
have been forced to extract whatever rule of law they can from
the High Court's divided reasoning in Lilly. Recognizing the
limited precedential value of a plurality opinion, the courts
have generally applied the Lilly holdings in a narrow manner,
seeking a balance between the need to extend the Court's ruling
where necessary while acknowledging the many issues left un-
decided by that case. 319 In doing so, the courts of appeals have
chosen the Marks "narrowest grounds" test, lacking an over-
arching paradigm that would help them evaluate potential vio-
lations of the Confrontation Clause. 320 The courts most
frequently find themselves considering questions about the ad-
missibility of statements against penal interest made by declar-
ants who are involved in some sort of governmental process.
Without direct guidance from the United States Supreme
Court, the courts of appeals are forced to distinguish for them-
selves between situations in which the Confrontation Clause is
violated and those where it is not.
319. Regular searches for Courts of Appeals cases have been completed using
Westlaw TM . This article does not examine any federal district court cases since
they lack the precedential value of the cases decided by the circuit court. For simi-
lar reasons, this article also does not rely on any unpublished cases decided by the
circuit courts. The last search was completed on October 26, 2001, the day on
which United States v. Ramirez, 271 F.3d 611, 613 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding Lilly
rule preventing admission of custodial statement against penal interest was not
applicable in sentencing hearings) was decided. Obviously, the circuits are just
beginning to absorb the Lilly holding and its implications. The analysis that fol-
lows is therefore only a preliminary view of a line of thought in process.
320. Ronald Marrero has also noted that the highly fractured rationale con-
tained within the Lilly decisions has left lower courts will no clear reasoning to
follow. See Ronald Marrero, Lilly v. Virginia Plurality Gets It Half Right, 10
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 185, 206 (2000).
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Several circuits have clearly asserted that custodial state-
ments made against the declarant's penal interest which also
implicate another person do not meet the particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness that the Lilly Court held necessary to
meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.3 21 How-
ever, even as they adopt that one clear statement in Lilly, the
courts find themselves limiting the Lilly holding to a very nar-
row rule of law, avoiding a broader extension of the rule than is
necessary. In United States v. Castelan, for example, the Sev-
enth Circuit noted that the fact that the declarant's confession
to law enforcement officers during a custodial interview should
be considered as "but one factor implicating the reliability of his
statements."322
In United States v. Photogrammetric Data Services, Inc.
the Fourth Circuit refused to read Lilly broadly enough to pre-
vent the admission of an accomplice's hearsay statement when-
ever "the government [had been] involved in the statement's
production." 323 Since there was "no [I attempt [I to shift or
spread blame to another," the court held the statement to be
admissible. 324
However, the circuits have also found reason to admit some
statements against penal interest that were made in circum-
stances involving government officials. A series of Second Cir-
cuit cases have held that plea allocutions, even if they implicate
others, possess the particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness that make them admissible in a codefendant's trial. In
United States v. Gallego, the Second Circuit held that portions
321. See, e.g., United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir.
2001), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, Nos. 99-1491 and 00-1348, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6036 (7th Cir. April 9, 2001) (affirming that "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness do not exist with respect to statements made while in police cus-
tody") (citations omitted); United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 669 (1st Cir. 2000),
cert. denied sub nom. Shea v. United States, 331 U.S. 1154 (February 20, 2001)
(reaffirming Lilly's holding against custodial statements against penal interest
under the circumstances of that case, although those circumstances inapposite to
the instant case). See also United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214, 1221-22 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that statements indirectly referring to defendant that were
made during declarants' detention at police station fall within the Lilly ruling,
although the court declined "to venture forth where the Supreme Court itself has
thus far refused to tread.").
322. 219 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2000).
323. 259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2001).
324. Id.
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of the declarant's plea allocution were properly admitted at his
codefendant's trial solely as evidence of a conspiracy.325 The
court affirmed the district court's holding that the declarant's
allocution possessed "'particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness,' rendering it 'sufficiently trustworthy' to justify its admis-
sion at trial."326 Other Second Circuit cases have helped refine
this rule. In United States v. Petrillo,327 the appellate bench re-
fused to grant a new trial for the defendant, a securities trader,
who claimed that the admission of his codefendant's plea allocu-
tion denied him his constitutional right to confront adverse wit-
nesses.328 The court held that the previously admitted plea
allocutions were "accompanied by such 'particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness' that cross-examination would have ad-
ded little to an evaluation of their reliability."329 This was
particularly the case where the admitted plea allocutions had
been redacted "so that they did not inculpate the defendant."330
The Second Circuit remains cognizant of the need to limit the
presumption of unreliability of custodial statements announced
in Lilly to facts similar to that case. In United States v. Do-
lah,331 the court noted that accepting arguments that the Lilly
rule should extend to "government involvement" too broadly
would "render inadmissible virtually all hearsay statements
against interest on the theory that the Government played a
role in the declarant's unavailability by declining to confer use
immunity."332 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has recently
adopted the Second Circuit's interpretation of the admissibility
of plea allocations under Lilly, noting that as long as the admis-
sions do not raise the same core concerns of the traditional ex
parte affidavit process, they can be considered reliable.33 3 The
mere fact that a defendant pleads guilty to receive a "good deal"
does not automatically imply that he lied about his guilt.334
325. 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Martinez v.
United States, 528 U.S. 1127 (2000).
326. Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
327. 237 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2000).
328. See id. at 122.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 122.
331. 245 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
332. Id. at 104-5.
333. United States v. Centracchio, 57 F.3d 518, 528 (7th Cir. 2001).
334. Id. at 529.
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Similarly, at least one circuit has held that grand jury testi-
mony against a declarant's penal interest that implicates a de-
fendant may be admitted into testimony unaffected by the Lilly
holding. 335 Accused with her husband of burning down their
convenience store in an effort to defraud their insurer, the peti-
tioner in United States v. Papajohn challenged the admissibility
of her stepson's grand jury testimony implicating her in the
crime. 336 Distinguishing this case from Lilly, while noting in an
aside that "since only four Justices concurred in the part of the
opinion on which Ms. Papajohn relies, it does not bind us," the
Eighth Circuit held that the facts surrounding the grand jury
testimony satisfied the "equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" test under Federal Rule of Evidence 807. 337
The declarant was not treated as a suspect in the crime, and
therefore did not have the same incentive to shift the blame
that was apparent in Lilly.338 Still, the court noted that "it can
almost always be said that a statement made by a declarant
that incriminates another person in a crime will make it less
likely that the declarant will be charged for that crime."339 The
Eighth Circuit stated, however, that the relative trustworthi-
ness the declarant's statement is always "a matter of degree,"
and that the defendant in this case had not been able to demon-
strate that the declarant had a clear incentive to lie in this
case.
340
The circuits have dealt with only a few other categories of
cases based on the Lilly decision. There have been several deci-
sions confirming that Lilly was only applicable to statements
made with government involvement: statements to one's girl-
335. United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 2000), reh'g
and reh'g en banc denied, No. 99-3417NISC, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 13572 (8th Cir.
June 13, 2000).
336. The witness had a complicated history in front of the grand jury. He
appeared three times. First, he asserted that he had no knowledge of the person
who burned the store; in his second appearance, he stated that the defendant and
her husband conspired to burn the store, and during his third appearance, he
claimed his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Defendant Papajohn chal-
lenged the admissibility of statements made at his second appearance in front of
the grand jury. Id. at 1116-17.
337. Id. at 1118-19.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1118-19.
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friend, father, or cellmate are not covered by the limitation es-
tablished in Lilly.341 Similarly, hearsay statements admitted at
a sentencing hearing are not bound by the Lilly holding since
"[a] defendant's confrontation rights at sentencing are severely
restricted."342 Finally, the Second Circuit has held that a hear-
say waiver by misconduct pursuant to Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 804(b)(6) is also not a Lilly issue since implicit in the Lilly
analysis is a presumption that the defendant has never waived
his right to confront the witness against him.343
The circuits, at least thus far, have sought to limit the Lilly
rule to its narrowest application. A recent treatise's observa-
tion that all nine Justices have indicated to some extent "that
admission of custodial statements to law enforcement personnel
against penal interest . . .whether or not they constitute[I a
confession," violates the Confrontation Clause rights of another
defendant if admitted at his trial without cross-examination is
not an indication of the limitation of that holding. 3" Without
any clear paradigm to follow, the circuits are left to develop
their own rules of law, providing little sense of precedent or reli-
ability for those who follow. The Supreme Court may have
"heightened" the standards for the admissibility of accomplices'
statements at a codefendant's trial, but only when limited to
facts quite similar to those in the Lilly case.34 5
341. See United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 416 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that father's statements to son were admissible and did not violate the rule estab-
lished in Lilly); United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 627-28 (7th Cir.
2001) (statements made to family members and cellmates are considered trustwor-
thy and admissible); United States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied sub nom. Herd v. United States, 531 U.S. 1170 (2001) (statements in
confidence to girlfriend not inadmissible under Lilly).
342. United States v. Ramirez, 271 F.3d 611, 613 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324, 1328 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 857 (1990)).
343. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 655 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 219 (2001).
344. United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 31
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6742 (2d ed. 2000)).
345. Though arguing that the Lilly standard of admissibility is a heightened
one, Sarah Heisler agrees that some of the federal courts have limited the impact
of the Lilly rule. See Sarah D. Heisler, My Brother, My Witness Against Me: The
Constitutionality of the "Against Penal Interest" Hearsay Exception in Confronta-
tion Clause Analysis, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 870 (2000).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Confrontation Clause remains a constitutional
statement absent a guiding paradigm. However, the competing
paradigmatic models are clear and becoming consistent, at least
as set out in the Lilly decision:
First: Justices Thomas and Scalia clearly advocate a re-
turn to their version of the historical intent of the clause.
Hence, their imposition of the need for confrontation on a trial
is limited to "witnesses" before the court and out-of-court testi-
mony offered specifically with the intention of providing evi-
dence for a court proceeding. Obviously, Mark Lilly's testimony
demanded the protection of confrontation for defendant Benja-
min. But the Thomas/Scalia restrictions, though clear, may be
limited by their categorical approach to confrontation. Moreo-
ver, their approach fails to develop precisely what form that
confrontation should take. Under this categorical approach,
must confrontation be face-to-face, or must it be at trial? Such
questions, fundamental to the jurisprudence of modern confron-
tation decisions, prevents the Scalia/Thomas philosophy from
becoming the dominant paradigm in these cases.
Second: Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, return considerations of the applicabil-
ity of the right to confront to a consideration of reliability. In
particular, Rehnquist warns that the plurality's "blanket ban
on government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate
defendants" goes much too far in the direction of excluding evi-
dence that may indeed prove valuable in securing accurate and
necessary conviction. Placing faith in the Roberts test for relia-
bility, Rehnquist simply would have remanded the Lilly convic-
tion for a trustworthiness assessment, seeing no need for any
clarification for the role and intention of the right of confronta-
tion in the judicial proceedings. Rehnquist and others therefore
have proposed a paradigm that is flexible and able to assimilate
many of the nuances and distinctions necessary for a paradigm
to succeed. However, the confrontation/rule of evidence para-
digm proposal fails to dominate because it makes the yet-refuta-
ble assumption that confrontation and hearsay essentially
revolve around the same considerations, shifting the focus of
this analysis solely to reliability. Though this paradigm has
grown in strength over the last twenty years, it fails to take into
506 [Vol. 22:455
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/7
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
account the issues raised by the Scalia/Thomas paradigm for-
mulation and therefore has been unable to dominate the con-
frontation landscape.
Third: Justice Breyer, although participating in the plural-
ity opinion authored by Justice Stevens, warns that the Court's
recent trend in confrontation cases rests on a possibly fallacious
assumption: that hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are
virtually one and the same. In so doing, Breyer's concurrence
adopts significant portions of the argument advocated in the
ACLU amicus brief filed in this matter. No circuit court has
referred to Breyer's position in any of its decisions.3 46
Therefore, despite the increasing clarity within and be-
tween the positions, there seems to be declining hope for any
resolution or agreement. Instead, the paradigms continue to
clash, offering divided decisions and no guidance for lower
courts throughout the federal and state judicial systems. Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence continues to search for princi-
ples and perhaps even meaning. Moreover, there is little
indication that any further Supreme Court consideration of the
matters is likely in the near future. None of the circuit cases
relying on Lilly have been granted certiorari to the High Court;
those who have petitioned for certiorari have had it denied.
Further, of the briefs currently on file347 for cases pending
before the Court, only two even mention the words "Confronta-
tion Clause" and none rely on the substantive holding in the
Lilly decision.348 As such, until a new paradigm arises, multiple
defendants may lose their rights to confront adverse witnesses
346. Natalie Kijurna has advocated Breyer's adoption of the ACLU categorical
approach as not only the most logical, but also one "necessary to save the right to
confrontation and untangle the web of confrontation-hearsay analysis that is cur-
rently plaguing the courts." See Natalie Kijurna, Lilly v. Virginia: The Confronta-
tion Clause and Hearsay - "Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave...", 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1133, 1189-90 (2001). However, there is no indication, either at the United
States Supreme Court or in the appellate courts, that this offers a paradigm ac-
ceptable to the other Justices of the High Court. Each Justice seems to have policy
considerations so distinct from the others that it is difficult to see how Breyer's
view could ever satisfy those competing demands.
347. At least of those available on-line as of October 26, 2001.
348. See Brief of Petitioner, Burford v. United States (No. 99-9073), 2000 WL
1718517, at *19-20 (Nov. 30, 2000). This brief discusses the standard of review
used by the Lilly plurality, but not the substantive ruling regarding the defen-
dant's right to confront his brother.
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and public policy is left without any benchmarks of confronta-
tion on which to rely. Articulations of various policies may
cause federal and state jurists at various levels to extend or di-
minish the protections of a constitutional clause without any
clear direction from the nation's highest court. Stare decisis
fails in its mission when there is no true precedent to follow. At
this point in the history of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
this has become the rule rather than the exception.
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